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As the tasks humans perform become more complicated and the technology 
manufactured to support those tasks becomes more assistive and adaptive, the 
relationship between humans and automation transforms into a collaborative system.  In 
this system each team member depends on the input of the other to reach a predetermined 
goal beneficial to both parties.  Studying the human/automation dynamic as a social team 
provides a new set of variables affecting performance and effectiveness previously 
unstudied by automation researchers.  One such variable is the shared mental model 
(Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).   
This study examined the relationship between mental model quality and 
collaborative system performance within the domain of a navigation task.  Participants 
navigated through the confines of a simulated city with the help of a navigational system 
that performed at two levels of accuracy; 70% and 100%.  Participants with robust 
(accurate) mental models of the task environment identified automation errors when they 
occurred and optimally navigated to specified destinations.  Conversely, users with vague 
(inaccurate) mental models of the task environment were less likely to identify 
automation errors, and chose inefficient routes to specified destinations.  Thus, mental 
model quality proved to be an efficient predictor of navigation performance.     
Additionally, participants with no mental model performed as well as participants with 
vague mental models.  The difference in performance between users with no mental 
models and users with inaccurate mental models was the number and type of errors 
committed.   
 
xi 
This research is important as it supports previous assertions that humans and 
automated systems can work as teammates and perform teamwork (Nass, Fog, & Moon, 
2000).  Thus, other variables found to impact human/human team performance might also 
affect human/automation team performance just as this study explored the effects of a 
primarily human/human team performance variable, the mental model.  Additionally, this 
research suggests that a training program creating a weak, inaccurate, or incomplete 
mental model in the user is equivalent to no training program in terms of pure 
performance.  Finally, through a qualitative model, this study proposes mental model 
quality affects the constructs of user self confidence and trust in automation.  These two 
constructs are thought to ultimately determine automation usage (Lee & Moray, 1994).  
To validate the model a follow on study is proposed to measure automation usage as 
mental model quality changes.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Automation has seeped into almost every facet of human life and its proliferation will 
surely continue with the advent of new and better technologies.  As the tasks humans perform 
become more complicated and the technology manufactured to support those tasks becomes 
more assistive and adaptive, a collaborative system consisting of a human user and an automated 
aid is formed.  In this system each team member depends on the input of the other to reach a 
predetermined goal beneficial to both parties.     
Much of the automation research in the human factors field has studied automation in the 
context of a decision aid (see Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 
2000, for reviews).  While scientifically beneficial, this research may have excluded some 
variables affecting the performance of the human/automation team.  Thinking of a collaborative 
system as a team and studying this dynamic in the same manner as human team researchers, 
other variables may be uncovered that will provide valuable insight into the future of automation 
design and human use.  To lay the foundation for this idea a review of four separate, but related 
research areas follows: 1) automation 2) computers as social actors 3) team performance and 4) 
situational awareness. 
Automation Research Review 
A simple definition of automation is the execution of a function by a machine that was 
previously carried out by a human (Parasuraman & Riley).  Sheridan (2002) explained further 
the wide and exhaustive categories of automation: 
Automation refers to (a) the mechanization and integration of the sensing of 
environmental variables (by artificial sensors); (b) data processing and decision 
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making (by computers); and (c) mechanical action (by motors or devices that 
apply forces on the environment) or “information action” by communication of 
processed information to people.  It can refer to open-loop operation on the 
environment or closed-loop control.”(p. 9)   
By these definitions automation could be as simple as a stapler or as complicated as a Combat 
Information Center aboard a Navy Destroyer.  With such an all encompassing definition, 
“automation can highlight, alert, filter, interpret, decide, and act for the operator.”(Lee, 2005, 
p.1577)  Sanchez (2005) identified six definitions within the automation literature and proposed 
his own, insightful definition that combined the most relevant aspects from each.  For the 
purposes of this paper I will use his definition: “automation is a technologically-based system 
used to partially or fully assist the human in tasks involving sensing, detecting, processing 
information, making decisions and/or executing actions.”(p. 11) 
  Even with this more precise definition of automation, the number and types of different 
systems and tasks within this problem space can seem daunting.  To standardize and simplify the 
domain even further researchers utilize a taxonomy developed by Parasuraman et al. (2000).  
They proposed four different types of automation based on its role: 1) information gathering, 2) 
information analysis, 3) decision selection, and 4) action based (See Figure 1).  These four types 
of automation are similar to a basic problem solving strategy where one would gather 
information about a problem, determine its relevance, come to a decision, and then see it through 
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Figure 1. Types of automation with level of human control or lack of control.  Adapted from 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens (2000). 
 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) also categorized automation into ten different levels based on 
the automation’s level of control or human lack of control.  For example, automation in the first 
takes action only when directed by the human whereas automation in level ten acts 
autonomously without human supervisory control.   An automated system could potentially act 
within all four types with varying degrees of level at each type.  For example, a global 
positioning system (GPS) navigational aid acts at a very high level of automation during the 
information gathering stage.  It receives signals from positioning satellites without permission of 
its human user to determine the systems current location.  During the information analysis stage, 
the GPS operates at a middle level as it takes the user-provided destination and compares it with 
the current location.  In the decision selection stage the GPS offers a recommended solution 
(high level) but does not actually make the decision (low level) on how to proceed.  During the 
action implementation stage the human makes all movement towards the desired destination, but 
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Where do collaborative systems fit into the automation levels and types proposed by 
Parasuraman et al. (2000)?  Collaborative system automation could potentially perform within all 
four classifications of automation (information acquisition and analysis, decision selection, and 
action implementation).  It can gather information, process it, make a recommendation, and even 
execute actions if the human teammate so desires.  On the other hand, collaborative system 
automation should not perform duties in all 10 levels classified by Parasuraman et al.  Any level 
that has the automation acting without regard to the human teammate is not collaborative.  
Collaborative automation works with the human towards a common goal and constantly gathers 
and processes new information while updating its recommendation and waiting for a final human 
decision.   
There are many factors that may affect the human/automation relationship and the 
resulting performance of the team.  Factors include mental workload, skill, confidence, task 
complexity, fatigue, and risk to name a few.  These factors either directly or indirectly affect user 
trust, reliance, and compliance with the automated system.  Inappropriate levels of trust are 
manifested in two types of errors 1) disuse, which is the user’s under reliance of the automation, 
or not using the automation as frequently as to benefit from its fullest capability and 2) misuse, 
which is over-reliance on automation, or using the automation when it performs incorrectly 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).   
 Several studies have examined how disuse and misuse errors, within the context of signal 
detection theory, adversely affect performance.  Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, and 
Beck (2003) found that errors on the part of an automated decision aid degraded user trust and 
influenced compliance with automated aids.  More specifically, when subjects observed the 
automation making an easily detectable error, they tended not to use that automation even when 
it was accurate in its future suggestions (disuse).  Dixon, Wickens, and McCarley (2006) found 
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the type of error committed by the automation affected user compliance and reliance; false 
alarms being easier to detect than misses tended to degrade user trust more than misses when 
they occurred (disuse).    Wickens, Dixon, and Johnson (2006) showed how error rate and task 
priority also affected user performance (misuse and disuse). Madhavan and Wiegmann (2005) 
found that labeling an automated aid as an expert or novice also influenced a user’s trust and 
would therefore influence use and performance (misuse).  Cost of an automation error is yet 
another factor that has been shown to influence user trust in automated systems.  As the cost of 
making an error rises, humans tend to rely less on automation and take more time and effort to 
confirm any decision recommended by the automation (misuse; Ezer, 2006).  Obviously, there is 
a host of factors and variables that cause misuse and disuse, and correspondingly affect user trust 
in and reliance of automated systems.  However, looking at this relationship as a collaborative 
system uncovers even more possible variables. 
Automation as a Teammate and Social Actor 
Within the collaborative system the human and the automation work as a team, but can 
humans actually view automated systems as teammates and equal partners in work?  Numerous 
studies have shown evidence that humans treat automation and specifically computers as social 
actors even when there is no reason to do so (Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 
2004; Nass & Moon, 2000; Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996; Nass, Moon, & Carney, 1999; Nass, 
Moon, & Green, 1997; Nass, Steuer, & Tauber, 1994; Reeves & Nass, 1996).  For example 
humans, exposed to a limited amount of cues, may apply social attributes to computers such as 
politeness, stereotypes, and notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ (Nass et al., 1994).  Researchers have 
also shown that by merely putting a colored arm band on a user and a matching colored border 
around a computer monitor, users will view the computer as a teammate and refer to it as such 
(Nass & Moon).  In all of these studies the participants realized they were interacting with the 
computer and not some programmer behind the automation.  However, they still unknowingly 
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interacted with these machines in a social way, even applying gender roles in one circumstance 
with the subtlest of cues (Nass et al., 1997). 
Although humans may be able to view computers and automation as social actors, can 
these same automated systems be considered teammates and perform teamwork?  
Interdependence and team identity play an important role in the team interaction between 
humans and automation.  Nass et al. (1996) manipulated the identity (told participants that they 
were part of a team with a computer) and interdependence (performance was based on combined 
efforts of the human/computer team) of a human-computer team, and found that humans viewed 
themselves as teammates with the computer.  They were more likely to comply with the 
computer’s advice, found the computer to be friendlier, and perceived the computer’s 
information to be of a higher quality.  Thus, telling users their performance will be evaluated in 
combination with their automated “teammate” should generate team identity and 
interdependence and lead to teamwork.  Salas, Kosarzcki, Tannenbaum, and Carnegie (2005) 
defined teamwork as a “set of interrelated behaviors, actions, and decisions that yield a shared 
and valued outcome.”(p. 136).  Researchers have shown people can and do perceive behavioral 
traits from automation (Nass et al., 1994).  Technology has given automation the ability to take 
independent action or work in consort with users.  Decisions recommended by automated 
systems are often in pursuit of the human defined goal.  Therefore, collaborative systems can be 
thought of as teams and studied as such. 
Knowing humans can view automation as a teammate and perhaps unknowingly apply 
team attributes to the automation, a set of variables previously unstudied may become important.  
In other words, any factor or variable that has been shown to affect the performance of human 
teams could potentially affect the performance of collaborative system teams in similar ways.  
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One variable that repeatedly surfaces in the team studies literature is the idea of a shared mental 
model.  Researching the effects of mental models on collaborative system performance is 
supported by Langan-Fox, Anglim, and Wilson (2004), who suggested that team research 
findings concerning mental models could potentially be applied to joint cognitive systems of 
humans and computers.   
Before examining the effects of mental models on collaborative systems a more detailed 
review of the concept is needed.  Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas and Cannon-Bowers (2000) 
stated, “Mental models are organized knowledge structures that allow individuals to interact with 
their environment.”(p.274).  Whereas the idea of humans possessing and using mental models 
may seem intuitive, there exists some disagreement in the mental model literature as to the 
definition and importance of this construct (Langan-Fox et al., 2004; Wilson & Rutherford, 
1989).  The most relevant definition of mental models for the purposes of this study and 
collaborative systems in general comes from Langan-Fox et al.; “Mental models are simulations 
that are run to produce qualitative and quantitative inferences, underpin our understanding of a 
system, and allow us to describe, predict, and explain behavior of a system.”(p 334).   
 Particularly important to teams and teamwork, shared mental models allow for a common 
understanding between group members of the task, the environment, and the abilities and 
responsibilities of each other (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998).  Salas, Prince, Baker, and 
Shrestha (1995) stated teams use mental models in two ways: 1) when communication is 
prohibited or degraded, shared mental models allow team members to anticipate teammate 
actions and their requirements for information or assistance, and 2) the shared mental model 
allows teammates to operate from a common frame of reference where everyone acts under the 
same perceived facts and assumptions.  Previous research has shown that well performing teams 
have robust, shared mental models whereas underachieving teams have inaccurate or vague 
shared mental models (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 2005; Mathieu, et 
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al., 2000; Serfaty, Entin, & Johnston, 1998).  The question then becomes, given that humans and 
automation can form a collaborative system, does performance improve or degrade with the 
quality of the mental model established in the human and programmed into the automation? 
Mental Models and Situational Awareness 
Not only do mental models support better team performance, but several situational 
awareness (SA) researchers believe that it plays a pivotal role in the formation of SA.  SA 
defined by Endsley (1995), “is the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future.”(p. 36).  Endsley parsed SA into three levels that simplify the construct, but that also 
point out the influence of mental models on the quality of SA.  Level 1 entails the perception of 
the environment and the task space.  Level 2 encompasses the comprehension of the 
environmental data and building of appropriate mental models.  Level 3 is the use of those 
mental models in the prediction of future states of the environment and task domain.  While each 
level of SA is individually important, without the construction of appropriate mental models, 
human ability to use SA to forecast future states is degraded and will ultimately affect task 
performance and problem resolution.  Dominguez (1994) also expressed the importance of 
mental models when she defined SA as the “continuous extraction of environmental information, 
integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture 
(model), and the use of that picture in directing further perception and anticipating future 
events.”(p. 11).   Dominguez viewed SA as having two dimensions; the process and the product.  
More specifically she holds that throughout the research literature, the product dimension of SA 
is commonly referred to as mental models.  Judging from the work of Endsley and Dominguez, 
mental models are of great importance in the construction and utilization of SA in the individual. 
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 Team SA is also greatly dependent on shared mental models.  Aircraft and submarine 
crews, nuclear power and manufacturing plant staffs, and fire fighters are examples where team 
SA is important in not only completing the mission, but in ensuring everyone survives.  Endsley 
(1995) found that higher level SA in teams was developed by the sharing of mental models that 
made communication more efficient and led to higher levels of performance.  Thus, it would 
appear that the increase in team performance due to shared mental models (Salas et al., 1995; 
Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1996; Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milanovich, 1999) was 
due in part to the establishment of SA with the help of those mental models.  The focus of this 
study is the establishment of shared mental models within the collaborative system team, the 
extension of that mental model to a navigational task, and the group performance evaluation 
when mental model quality is manipulated. 
Current Study and Hypotheses  
In this study mental model quality was the independent variable in a split plot design.  
The quality of the participant mental model was defined operationally by their performance on a 
series of acquisition tasks.  A poor or vague mental model group (low acquisition group), an 
excellent or robust mental model group (high acquisition group), and a no mental model group 
(no acquisition group) performed a navigation task within the confines of a simulated city with 
the help of an automated navigational aid performing at two levels of accuracy.  The human and 
the aid formed a collaborative system with the goal of navigating to specified destinations from 
predetermined start points as efficiently as possible.   
To establish the quality of the mental model within the three groups a training method 
consisting of city relational, directional, and construction tasks was used.  Participants spent time 
learning the spatial relationships of the city within an allotted amount of time.  After study they 
continued to establish, to varying degrees, their mental models of the task environment by 
answering questions about the spatial relationship of the city blocks.  Relational questions 
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featured questions about city blocks adjacent to one another.  Directional questions addressed 
block distance and direction from other blocks.  Finally, a map reconstruction task assessed the 
participants’ ability to re-build the map from a random assortment of city blocks.  Participant 
performance on these tasks operationally defined the quality of their mental models.  Participants 
in the high acquisition group were required to answer 90-100% at the conclusion of five 
iterations of the acquisitions tasks.  Low acquisition group participants were not required to 
reach a specified criterion, but were only allowed to complete the acquisition iteration one time.  
Lastly, the no acquisition group had no prior experience with the city and performed the 
navigation tasks only.  
This method of building different levels of mental model quality in participants is not 
only supported by Gilbert and Rogers (1999), but also by the work of Thorndyke and his 
colleagues (Goldin & Thorndyke, 1982; Thorndyke & Stasz, 1980; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 
1982).  Thorndyke, through a series of studies, examined how humans acquire spatial knowledge 
from maps and navigation and how they use that knowledge to make various estimates and 
decisions.  He suggested that people create mental models to learn maps and then use those 
models to make spatial judgments.  He also contended that with greater exposure to the map and 
experience with the spatial arrangements, people would increase the accuracy of their judgments.  
Certain procedures were found to be beneficial to acquiring spatial knowledge from a map.  They 
were partitioning, imagery, and relation encoding.  Partitioning refers to the procedure whereby a 
participant would learn only a small segment of the map before moving on to a new, unlearned 
portion.  The proposed method supports this by forcing participants to attend to a specific portion 
of the map at one time (relational questions).  Imagery was the procedure in which participants 
attempted to place the map information into a mental model to be retrieved later.  Relation 
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encoding was the procedure that entailed participants attending to the actual directional 
relationships of prominent features on the map.  They noticed that a group of buildings were 
below a river or that a certain building was east of another.  This procedure is reflected in the 
directional and relational questions used in the current method.  In summary, this study’s method 
of building mental models of map data builds upon those procedures shown to support the 
acquisition of spatial information from maps.  
During the navigation test phase, participants navigated from predetermined start points 
on the map to destinations.  Since only the origin and destinations were provided along with a 
blank map, they were forced to rely on their mental models, their automated teammate, or a 
combination of the two.  There were two levels of automation support: 1) 70% automation 
accuracy, and 2) 100% automation accuracy.  The 70% level was chosen based on previous 
research that indicated 70% automation accuracy allowed participants to notice a decrement in 
support, but the accuracy level also maintained some trust and participants still relied on the aid 
to a certain extent (Kantowitz, Hanowski, & Kantowitz, 1997; McGuirl & Sarter, 2006).  After 
completing the trial blocks participants engaged in a test of learning consisting of all the 
acquisition tasks from early in the procedure (map reconstruction, relational and directional 
questions) to measure improvement or decline in mental model quality.  Critical measures were 
the number of optimal routes selected, the number of misuse and disuse errors committed, and 
subjective assessments of automation reliability after each block of trials.  At the conclusion of 
the study, participants completed a subjective survey to measure their self-confidence and the 
level of trust in the automation  
This method was designed to answer the following research questions.  RQ1.  Does the 
quality of user mental model positively affect performance in a collaborative system?  H1. With 
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the assistance of an automated teammate, participants in the high acquisition group should 
perform better than participants in the low and no acquisition groups.  Participants with a 
detailed mental model will more accurately identify errors in the automation and will optimally 
rely on the aid.  Stated another way, users in the high acquisition group will rely on the 
automation when it is correct and will determine their own solution when the automation is 
incorrect, thus optimally performing. 
 RQ2.  Is having a vague mental model worse than having no mental model at all?  H2.  
Participants in the no acquisition group will have no experience with the city and no resources to 
draw upon when navigating the city except for the automated navigational aid.  They may be 
forced to blindly trust the automation and its recommendation.  On the other hand, participants in 
the low acquisition group should have a vague and most likely inaccurate mental model to draw 
upon when navigating.  This may lead them to distrust the automation when it is in their best 
interest to comply with its recommendations. 
 




29 male (age M = 20.38, SD = 1.43) and 31 female (age M = 20.00, SD = 1.57) 
undergraduate students from the Georgia Institute of Technology participated in this study.  They 
were enrolled in an introductory psychology course and received credit or monetary 
compensation for their participation.  Participants were required to possess 20/40 vision 
(corrected) or better to read the displays and distinguish between items within the task trials.  
Red/green colorblindness was a disqualifier for the study due to the use of color as a 
discriminator among common shapes within the task trials.  Figure 2 shows the ethnicity of 













Figure 2. Sample ethnicity by percentage. 
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Materials 
Prior to beginning the experimental tasks and the acquisition of mental models 
participants conducted cognitive and perceptual abilities tests. The Digit Symbol Substitution 
Test (Wechsler, 1997), Reverse Digit Span Test (Wechsler), and the Shipley Vocabulary Test 
(Shipley, 1986) measured perceptual speed, memory span, and verbal ability respectively.  Two 
tests were used to measure spatial ability, the Cube Comparison Test and the Paper Folding Test 
(Ekstrom, French, & Harmon, 1979).  Ability tests were used to describe the participant sample 
and compare the three experimental groups at the conclusion of the study.  Participants also had 
their vision tested to the 20/40 level using the Reduced Snellen chart (from 14 inches) and the 
Snellen chart (from 20 feet) and completed Ishihara’s test for color deficiency (Ishihara, 1960).  
A demographics and health survey was administered to assist in describing the study sample.  A 
trust in automation survey (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 2000; see appendix A) was also administered 
to gauge the preconceived notions of automation reliability within the sample.       
A map (see Figure 3) similar to the one used by Jastrzembski, Roring, and Charness 
(2006) constructed of streets and buildings was the task environment.  The city contained a four 
by four block structure graphically simulated.  Each city block was unique by a combination of 
shapes, colors, and orientation.  All stimuli and tasks were presented on a 15 inch, color monitor.  
The experiment was programmed using Java.  Participants used an optical mouse and a standard 
QWERTY keyboard for input devices.  A nine question subjective survey (see appendix B) using 
a 5 point Likert Scale was presented to participants after the completion of all experimental tasks 
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Figure 3. Task environment; simulated city as seen by participants in map study.   
Design 
 A 3x2 split plot design was used with three levels of acquisition (between subjects); no, 
low, and high, crossed with two levels of automation reliability (within subjects); 70% and 
100%.  The study manipulated the acquisition level of the participants by varying their exposure 
to and experience with the simulated city map.  The map reconstruction task along with 
relational and directional questions made up one acquisition iteration.  The high acquisition 
group completed five iterations of the acquisition tasks before moving on to navigation trials.  
The low acquisition group completed one iteration of the tasks, while the no acquisition group 
was restricted from viewing the map prior to navigation trials.   
Automation reliability during navigational trials was determined by the accuracy of the 
automation recommendation.  During the 70% reliability condition, the automation provided the 
correct solution on 14 out of 20 trials.  The automation performed without error during the 100% 
reliability condition.  The order of the 70% and 100% trial blocks was counterbalanced across 
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participants to guard against recency effects (Sanchez, Ezer, Rogers, & Fisk, 2006).    Critical 
measures during the navigation task trials were the number of optimal routes selected, along with 
the number of misuse and disuse errors committed.  Between navigation trial blocks, participants 
answered one subjective question concerning the accuracy of the automation for the preceding 
trials.  Once the trial blocks were over, participants performed a test of learning consisting of the 
acquisition tasks to measure learning acquired during navigation trials. At the conclusion of the 
study participants completed a subjective survey designed to measure self-confidence and trust in 
the automation. 
Tasks and Procedure 
Once participants arrived they completed an informed consent form, demographics and 
health survey, trust in automation survey, and the battery of ability tests described earlier.  After 
completing the ability tests, participants began the acquisition phase of the study.  See Appendix 
C for examples of trials and Appendix D for detailed instructions.  The method used in the 
Gilbert and Rogers (1999) study served to build different levels of city mental models in the low 
and high acquisition groups.  To familiarize participants with the program and the input devices 
they completed an introductory task (see Appendix C, Figure 19).  They performed three trials 
where they moved shapes from the peripheral edge of the screen to assigned blocks on a four by 
four city grid.   On each trial there were four numbered blocks; these numbers corresponded to a 
number on the four by four grid map.  Once the participants dragged and dropped the blocks onto 
the appropriate grid they selected a submit button with the mouse.  After selecting the submit 
button, they received feedback on the block placement task and moved onto the next practice 
trial.  Participants completed three trials regardless of performance. 
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Acquisition Phase 
In the mental model acquisition phase participants studied the city map for one minute, 
performed a distracter task (subtract a value from a given value for 30 seconds), and then 
performed tasks to show they understood the spatial relationship among the 16 city blocks.  
Acquisition was tested with a series of relational and directional questions along with a map 
reconstruction task.  The map reconstruction task (see Figure 4) entailed showing the entire city 
separated by blocks and displayed on the periphery of the 15 inch screen.  Participants moved, 
via the mouse, the blocks onto their appropriate grids on a checkerboard reference system.  Once 
the blocks were in position, the participant selected the submit button with the mouse and 
received feedback in the following form: “you got 14 out of 16 correct”.  
 
Figure 4. Map reconstruction task. 
Relational questions (see Figure 5) presented one city block and then asked in the form 
of a True/False question if the block was north, south, east or west of the second city block.  
These questions used blocks that were in direct contact with each other.  For each relational 
block of trials, there were two practice questions and 16 test questions.  These questions were 
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randomly selected from a bank of 36 trials.  After submitting the true/false answer, the 
participant received feedback in the following format: “Sorry you answered incorrectly” or “That 
is correct”. 
 
Figure 5. Example of relational question. 
The directional questions (see Figure 6) displayed two city blocks and asked how many 
blocks and in what direction one would travel to get from one block to the other.  Directional 
questions involved blocks that were separated by up to three blocks.  Two practice questions 
were administered before the 16 test questions.  These questions were also randomly selected 
from a bank of 36 trials.  Feedback after each trial was in the following format:  “Sorry you 
answered incorrectly” or “That is correct”.   
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Figure 6. Example of directional question.   
The high acquisition group completed five iterations of the acquisition trials (map 
reconstruction, relational questions, and directional questions) before moving on to navigation 
trials while the low acquisition group completed one iteration before moving on.  The no 
acquisition group skipped the acquisition phase of the study and went directly into the navigation 
phase.  
Navigation Phase 
 The navigation phase consisted of two blocks of 20 trials each.  The 70% automation 
support and a 100% automation support block were counterbalanced across participants.  The six 
error trials within the 70% block were randomly placed for each participant with the following 
heuristic: error trials could be placed in trials 1-20 at random, but no more than two error trials 
could occur simultaneously.  For instance a random selection of error trials could have placed 
one error trial in trial 1 and another in trial 2, this would enact the heuristic within the program 
and trial number 3 would automatically be filled with a correct automation trial.  The 14 correct 
trials in the 70% automation support block and the 20 trials in the 100% automation support 
block were randomly selected from a pool of 64 trials.  The 64 trials were constructed to ensure 
each of the 16 city blocks was utilized as the origin in at least 4 trials. 
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 Each navigation trial (see Appendix C, Figure 24) displayed a blank city grid (the map 
with all colored shapes removed), an origin, a destination, and an automated recommendation.  
The origin was placed in the upper left side of the screen and consisted of one city block with a 
red, oval icon placed on one side of the block.  The icon indicated the exact, current location of 
the origin in relation to the center of the block.  For instance, if the icon was placed on the top 
side of the block, then the participant would know that the origin was on the north side of that 
particular block.  The destination was placed just below the origin and took the form of another 
city block with a red icon indicating the exact location of the destination.  The automated route 
recommendation was depicted as a green line placed on the blank city map.  At one end of the 
green line was a red, oval icon.  Participants were told the red, oval icon connected with the 
green line corresponded to the origin which was also given in the upper left corner of the screen.  
Participants used the mouse to drag the red icon from the given destination to the given origin.  
Again, in the 70% block trial only, there were six trials in which the green line (automation’s 
recommendation) was inaccurate.  In all other trials the green line correctly depicted an optimal 
route from origin to destination.   
 Once participants moved the icon to a desired location on the map they had the choice of 
submitting that route for feedback or resetting the map.  Resetting the map erased the route 
traced by the participant, and placed the icon back to its original location (origin).  The reset 
option was only available once per trial.  The submit option would result in one of three feedback 
conditions, 1) Congratulations!  You found the optimal route. 2) Good job, you found your way 
and 3) Sorry, you ended up in the wrong place.  Feedback condition 1 resulted when the 
participant moved the icon from origin to destination in the shortest distance.  Feedback 
condition 2 resulted when the participant moved the icon from origin to destination, but took 
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unnecessary additional turns.  Feedback condition 3 resulted when the participant placed the icon 
anywhere on the map but the destination. 
 After each trial block, participants were cued with the following statement; “Please 
indicate, using a number, the reliability of the automated navigation system over the last block of 
trials.  (Example:  I think the navigation system was XX% reliable.)”  Using the keyboard, 
participants entered a two or three digit number.  Once the entry was made participants moved 
onto the next block of trials or the test of learning.    
Test of Learning  
 Upon completion of the navigation phase, participants conducted the map reconstruction 
task, 16 trials of relational questions, and 16 trials of directional questions.  Only members of the 
no acquisition group received practice trials during the test of learning.  Once the test of learning 
was complete the experimenter instructed the participants to complete the 9 question subjective 
survey.  When this was complete the participants were debriefed and released.     
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 Unless stated otherwise, alpha was set at .05 for all statistical tests, all t tests utilized the 
two tailed analysis, and all error bars are standard error bars. 
 Abilities Tests  
 To explore group differences on the five abilities tests a MANOVA was used, Wilk’s λ = 
.887, p = .710.  Table 1 depicts the univariate ANOVAs for each statistical test.  These results 
indicate that the three acquisition groups did not significantly differ in their performance on the 
five abilities tests.   
Table 1. Analysis of Variance for Abilities Tests 
Ability Test F p 
Cube Comparison 0.827 0.442 
Paper Folding 1.003 0.373 
Reverse Digit Span 1.622 0.207 
Shipley Institute of Living Scale 0.329 0.721 
Digit Symbol Substitution 1.187 0.313 
   
Acquisition Performance 
 The low and high acquisition groups performed one and five iterations of the acquisition 
tasks respectively.  The low acquisition group’s performance was marginal on their iteration ( M 
= 33.03%, SD = 11.80%).  This measure provides support for the assertion that members of this 
group entered into the navigation task with a weak, vague, or incomplete mental model.  The 
high acquisition group’s performance on the five iterations is depicted in Figure 7.  The mean 
performance for members of this group on the last iteration before the navigation task was near 
ceiling (M=96.26%, SD= 3.72%).  This performance supports the idea that the high acquisition 
group entered into navigation task with a robust and very accurate mental model of the city map. 
 
        23  
Iteration Number
















Figure 7. High acquisition group performance on each of the five acquisition iterations 
prior to navigation task.     
 
Navigation Task 
 After acquiring varying levels of experience (and presumably levels of mental model) 
with the task environment, the three acquisition groups conducted two blocks of 20 navigation 
trials.  Among the measures collected during navigation, four were particularly relevant; optimal 
routes selected, misuse errors, disuse errors, and response time.  To analyze the first measure, a 
3x2 (acquisition group x automation support level) split plot ANOVA was conducted.  There 
was a main effect for Acquisition Group, F(2, 57) = 44.41, p<.0001; a main effect for 
Automation Support, F(1, 57) = 191.361, p<.0001; and an interaction for Group x Support, F(2, 
57) = 29.40, p<.0001.  Figures 8 and 9 depict the means for the main effect of group and 
interaction effect respectively for the dependent measure of optimal routes selected.   
 






































Figure 9. Marginal means of optimal routes plotted by level of automation support. xxxxxxxxxx     
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 To explore the interaction, independent sample t-tests were conducted.  In this analysis 
the acquisition group performances during the 70% automation accuracy block and the 100% 
automation accuracy block were tested separately.  Using Bonferroni’s correction, Alpha was set 
to .0083.  Table 2 shows the results of this analysis.  These results indicate that high acquisition 
group performance during the 70% block trial was significantly better than the performance of 
both the no and low acquisition groups.  Additionally, the no and low acquisition group 
performances during this block of trials were not statistically different.  During the 100% block 
of trials all three groups performed at the same level, with no statistical difference between them.    
Table 2. Post hoc independent groups t-tests for split plot ANOVA of optimal routes  
Trial Block Groups t p 
No vs Low -1.24 .224*
No vs High -15.20 .0001*70% Automation Accuracy  
Low vs High -5.96 .0001*
No vs Low 1.67 .105*
No vs High -1.44 .159*100% Automation Accuracy  
Low vs High -2.32 .026*
Note. * Sig. at alpha = .0083 
 
Response Time 
 To measure response time the program incorporated a time log that began immediately 
upon trial initiation.  The time log stopped when participants selected the SUBMIT button with 
the mouse.  A split plot ANOVA found a main effect of automation support, but no effect for 
acquisition group and no interaction.  Table 3 contains the ANOVA summary table and Figure 
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Table 3. Analysis of Variance for Response Time 
Source df F p 
Group (G) 2 2.994 0.058* 
between-group error 57 (17244151.160)  
Automation Support (A) 1 13.376 0.001* 
G x A 2 0.247 0.782* 
within-group error 57 (9987680.849)   
Note.  Values enclosed by parentheses are mean square errors.  *p<.01. 

























 Table 3 and Figure 10 show that overall, participants completed trials within the 100% 
block faster than in the 70% block.  Additionally, within each trial block groups completed trials 
at equal time intervals.  Put another way mental model quality did not influence response time 
significantly, but automation support did.   
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Errors 
 While there was no significant difference in performance during the 100% block of trials 
there were some trends among the groups worth noting.  Table 4 shows the number of 
participants committing disuse errors (misuse errors were not possible as the automation’s 
recommendation was always correct) within the 100% block, the number of disuse errors 
committed, and the trial number in which the error occurred.   
Table 4. 100% trial block trends.     
participant ID acquisition group disuse errors trial number 
527 High 1 7 
107 Low 1 3 
108 Low 1 3 
110 Low 1 20 
112 Low 2 4 & 8  
117 Low 1 16 
124 Low 4 1,2,6, & 9 
125 Low 3 9, 10, & 12 
10 No 1 7 
13 No 1 2 
16 No 1 1 
17 No 1 3 
 
 The data from Table 4 show more participants in the low acquisition group comitting 
disuse errors in the 100% block of trials with three participants comitting multiple errors.  While 
there were four participants within the no acquisition group that comitted a disuse error, they all 
comitted one error only and that error occurred relatively early in the trial block.  Although not 
statistically supported, the trends depicted in Table 4 suggest that the low acquisition group was 
more prone to errors within the 100% block of trials.     
 Due to the near ceiling performance of all three groups during the 100% block trials, 
further analysis of misuse and disuse errors will focus only on the 70% block trials.  Figure 11 
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shows the mean misuse errors committed by group during the 70% block, F (2, 57) = 73.069, 
p<.0001.  Post hoc t-tests using Tukey’s HSD are shown in Table 5.  These analyses show that 
the three groups differed significantly with respect to the number of misuse errors committed 
during the 70% block trials.  The no acquisition group committed the most errors, M = 5.5, SD = 
1.0.  The most misuse errors possible within this block of trials was 6, indicating that most 
members of the no acquisition group continued to rely on the automation in the face of errors.  
The low acquisition group committed the next highest level of misuse errors, M = 2.45, SD 
=1.985.  The high acquisition group committed the fewest number of misuse errors, M = .4, SD 
= .681.    
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Table 5. Post hoc independent groups t-tests for ANOVA of misuse errors 
Trial Block Groups t p 
No vs Low 6.13 <.0001*
No vs High -15.20 <.0001*70% Automation Accuracy  
Low vs High -5.96 <.0001*
Note.Tukey's HSD, * Sig. at alpha = .05 
 
 Figure 12 shows the mean number of disuse errors committed by group during the 70% 
block.  A univariate ANOVA of these means yielded significance, F(2,57) = 6.615, p= .003.  To 
follow up this analysis, post hoc t-tests using Tukey’s HSD were conducted and the results are 
displayed in Table 6.  While the low acquisition group committed more disuse errors (M= 1.50, 
SD= 1.701), the no acquisition group (M=.45, SD= .945) and the high acquisition group (M=.25, 
SD= .550) committed the same number of disuse errors statistically.    
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Table 6. Post hoc independent groups t-tests for ANOVA of disuse errors 
Trial Block Groups t p 
No vs Low -2.41 .017*
No vs High 0.82 .851*70% Automation Accuracy  
Low vs High 3.13 .004*
Note.Tukey's HSD, *Sig. p <.05 
 
Estimation of Automation Reliability 
 Between each block of navigation trials, participants were asked the following question; 
“Please indicate, using a number, the reliability of the automated navigation system over the last 
block of trials.  (Example: I think the navigation system was XX% reliable.)” Figure 13 shows 
the mean responses for this question for each group by trial block.  Table 7 shows the descriptive 
statistics not represented by Figure 13. 





















70% Trial Block 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics for automation reliability assessments post trial block.   
Group Range Min Max M SE SD Variance 
No Acquisition 70% Assessment 48 50 98 75.150 2.892 12.934 167.292 
  100% Assessment 10 90 100 98.450 0.731 3.268 10.682 
Low Acquisition 70% Assessment 30 60 90 75.500 1.916 8.569 73.421 
  100% Assessment 10 90 100 99.350 0.504 2.254 5.082 
High Acquisition 70% Assessment 30 60 90 77.000 2.000 8.944 80.000 
 100% Assessment 5 95 100 99.500 0.344 1.539 2.368 
 
 
 The results depicted in Figure 13 and Table 7 indicate no significant difference in the 
groups’ ability to assess the reliability of the automation.  During the 100% block trials, all three 
groups rated the reliability of the navigational aid near 100%.  During the 70% block trials all 
three groups tended to overestimate the reliability of the aid.  F-tests for the equality of variances 
between the three groups were non-significant.  Thus, the means and the variances for the 
subjective measure of automation reliability were not significantly different with one exception.  
Table 8 shows the results of the F tests for equality of variances of assessments between the three 
acquisition groups for each block of trials.  Only the variance of the high and no acquisition 
groups in the 100% block trial differ in their variability.      






70% Automation Accuracy No Acquisition 2.2785 2.0911*
 Low Acquisition  1.0896*
     
100% Automation Accuracy No Acquisition 2.102 4.512*
 Low Acquisition 2.146*
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Test of Learning 
 The test of learning was placed at the end of the navigation trials to measure any learning 
that may have resulted due to the experience of navigating through the city.  Table 9 depicts the 
performance of the three acquisition groups on the test of learning compared with each groups’ 
performance on the acquisition phase prior to the navigation trials if applicable.  Paired sample t-
tests were conducted to examine if there was any change in performance between the acquisition 
phase and the test of learning.  
 This analysis shows no significant change in performance, and presumably mental model, 
from the last acquisition phase and the test of learning for the high acquisition group.  
Conversely, the low acquisition group showed significant improvement from acquisition to test 
of learning.  Since the no acquisition group started the study with the navigation trials, there are 
no descriptive statistics for the acquisition iteration and no paired sample t-test results for this 
group.    
Table 9. Mean and Standard deviation statistics by group for last acquisition iteration and 
test of learning.  Paired sample t-tests if applicable. 
  
Acquisition 
Iteration Test of Learning Paired T-test 
Acquisistion Group M SD M SD T p 
No NA NA 15.74% 10.22% NA NA
Low 33.03% 11.80% 55.85% 27.17% -4.673 <.0001*
High 96.26% 3.72% 96.98% 2.97% -0.649 0.524*
Note. * p<.025 
 
 The test of learning serves as the best method for measuring mental model quality in this 
study.  Figure 14 depicts performance during the 70% block of trials plotted against performance 
on the test of learning.  A regression analysis yielded R2= .571.  Therefore, if the test of learning 
is an adequate representation of the participants’ mental model, then it would seem that the 
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quality of the mental model predicts performance.  In other words, the more accurate the mental 
model the better the performance during navigation trials in the 70% block.   

























 The nine question subjective survey was originally designed to assess the participants’ 
self-confidence in navigation ability, feeling of team interdependence, and trust in the 
automation.  However, after running a principal components analysis on the survey data, only 
two dominant components were found.  The principal components analysis was followed up with 
an exploratory factor analysis on the two dominant components.  The loadings of this analysis 
suggested that the two common factors present in the data were representations of self 
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confidence and trust.  Table 10 displays the loadings of the common factors for each of the nine 
questions in the subjective survey.  Questions 1, 3, and 7 loaded primarily on the common factor 
of self-confidence whereas questions 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 loaded primarily on the common factor 
of trust in the automation.  Figure 15 shows the factor plot in rotated factor space depicts the 
dimensionality of the items within the survey.    
Table 10.Rotated factor matrix for subjective survey 
  Common Factors 
 Confidence Trust 
Survey Question 1 2 
1 0.818 0.056 
2 -0.068 0.688 
3 0.825 0.113 
4 0.100 0.727 
5 0.066 0.781 
6 0.060 0.529 
7 0.810 0.001 
8 -0.588 0.508 
9 -0.065 0.432 
Note.Principal axis factoring with Varimax rotation 
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Figure 15. Factor plot in rotated factor space.





















 Measures for trust in the automation and self-confidence in navigation ability were 
created using the questions associated with each common factor.  A univariate ANOVA showed 
the three groups differed significantly on the measure of trust, F(2, 57) = 8.554, p = .001.  The 
trust means for each group are illustrated in Figure 16.  Post hoc multiple comparisons using 
Tukey’s HSD were performed and are depicted in Table 11.  The low acquisition group’s rating 
of trust in the automation was significantly higher than the ratings of the other two groups.  Prior 
to the study, participants completed a general trust in automation survey (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury 
2000) intended to measure their preconceived notions of automation and reliability.  The three 
groups did not differ in their ratings of trust in automation prior to the study; F(2,57)= 1.231, 
p=.30.   
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 Group means for the self-confidence measure were also tested using an ANOVA, F(2,57) 
= 38.156, p <.0001.  Post hoc multiply comparisons using Tukey’s HSD (Table 11) showed the 
high acquisition group as having significantly higher scores than the no and low acquisition 
groups.  There was no significant difference between the confidence scores for the no and low 
acquisition groups.  Figure 17 depicts the means of the three groups on the self-confidence 
measure.   
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Table 11. Multiple comparisons for Trust and Self Confidence.  
  Low Acquisition High Acquisition 
Trust No Acquisition .002* .999*
 Low Acquisition .002*
     
Self Confidence No Acquisition .063* <.0001*
 Low Acquisition <.0001*
  
Note. *p<.05 Tukey's HSD 
 
 To evaluate the reliability of the common factors of trust and self confidence Cronbach’s 
alpha was used.  The statistic measures how well a set of items measure a one-dimensional latent 
construct and is often thought of as a coefficient of reliability.  Table 12 displays Cronbach’s 
alpha for all nine items within the subject survey as well as Cronbach’s alpha for the common 
factors of trust and self confidence.  The relatively high coefficients for trust and self confidence 
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compared with the alpha for all items supports the claim that the items within each common 
factor are measuring the same construct; trust and self confidence. 
Table 12. Reliability coefficients for common factors. 
Items Construct Cronbach's Alpha 
1 through 9 Survey 0.651 
1, 3, & 7 Self Confidence 0.857 
2, 4, 5, 6, 8, & 9 Trust 0.759 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 This study was designed to answer two research questions; does quality of the user 
mental model predict performance when collaborating with automation and how does having a 
weak or vague mental model compare with having no mental model at all.  These questions are 
important as they examine the effects of a variable (mental model) previously unstudied in 
association with automation.   
Mental Models and Performance 
 The results of this study support the idea that mental model quality predicts performance 
while collaborating with an automated teammate.  The high acquisition group performed 
significantly better than the other groups in navigating the city map and the no acquisition group 
predominately relied on the automation regardless of reliability.  The low acquisition group, 
while performing at the same level as the no acquisition group in both trial blocks, showed 
significantly more variability in performance.  In other words, some participants within the low 
acquisition group were able to acquire higher quality mental models while others were not (See 
Figure 14).  The no acquisition group consistently complied with the recommendation of the 
automation and thus performed very well in the 100% block of trials but very poorly (matching 
the performance of the automation) in the 70% block of trials.    Performance on the test of 
learning (see Figure 14) demonstrates the positive linear relationship between mental model 
quality and performance, regardless of group membership.  Thus, users possessing high quality, 
accurate mental models of the task environment outperformed users possessing lower quality, 
inaccurate mental models.         
 Denying the no acquisition group’s exposure to the task environment before navigation 
trials ensured participants within this group had no mental model to reference during navigation.  
The test of learning showed that this group acquired some knowledge during navigation; 
however, even with some learning the no acquisition group’s mental models after navigation 
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were worse than the low acquisition group’s mental models prior to navigation.  Yet, these two 
groups’ performances, measured by optimal routes selected, were the same statistically.   During 
the 100% block of trials, both groups performed near ceiling, but during the 70% block of trials 
they both performed near chance (relying solely on the automation in the 70% block of trials 
would result in 14 optimal routes selected).  Whereas the two groups performed equally, the 
number and type of errors committed were significantly different.  The low acquisition group 
committed significantly more disuse errors and significantly fewer misuse errors than the no 
acquisition group.  Thus, in terms of performance, there was no difference between having some 
mental model and having no mental model, but the type of errors committed by each group was 
very different.   
 Whereas the no acquisition group’s performance was certainly not good (chance level), it 
was predictable.  It follows that a participant with no mental model of the task environment 
would rely on an aid even in the face of errors.  The advantage of this predictability in the 
applied setting is if one knows the likely error rate of the automation one could mitigate the 
number of errors committed by an inexperienced (no mental model) user by adding supervision, 
adding systems, or by taking some other action to mitigate the risk of errors by the system.  The 
low acquisition group’s performance, equal to that of the no acquisition group, was 
unpredictable.  Meaning the group committed both disuse and misuse errors.  Disuse errors are 
potentially worse than misuse errors because they are the fault of the user only.  The automation 
performs correctly, but the user rejects the recommendation and fails in spite of it.  In the applied 
setting this could manifest itself in the mildly experienced user deviating from the correct 
recommendation of the automation and committing egregious system errors.  This type of user 
possesses a mental model that may be incorrect and therefore conflict with the automation even 
when the aid is correct.  The unpredictable nature of the low acquisition  group supports the 
claim that having a weak or vague mental model may be worse than having no mental model at 
all; supporting the anecdotal saying “just enough information to be dangerous”.   
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Self-Confidence and Trust 
 Numerous studies have proposed that users posses a bias towards automation that results 
in a perfect automation schema (Dzindolet, Peirce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001; Dzindolet, 
Peirce, Beck, & Dawe, 2002; Madhavan, Weigmann, & Lacson, 2006; and Weigmann, 2002).  
This schema holds that in general, automated systems operate without error.   Another theorized 
result of the perfect automation schema is errors identified as easy degrade trust rapidly 
(Madhaven et al.).  In the current study, the ability to identify automation errors as easy or hard 
varied with group.  For example the high acquisition group, having studied and been tested on 
the map numerous times, was better equipped to classify automation errors.  The low acquisition 
group, having some prior map experience, was somewhat equipped to classify automation errors.  
It would follow then, that the errors produced by the automation were perceived as easy errors by 
the high acquisition group and this perception severely degraded the trust held for the 
automation.  The low ratings of trust (compared to the low acquisition group) support this.      
 Because the no acquisition group experienced the city map through the navigation task 
alone, they were not equipped to classify automation errors, but they were able to identify when 
the automation made an error.  The no acquisition group had little choice but to comply with the 
recommendation of the automated aid.  Correspondingly, this group made more misuse errors 
and very few disuse errors.  By following the recommendation of the automation in almost every 
instance this group was able to realize the true frequency of automation generated errors without 
having the mental model quality that the high acquisition group possessed.  Thus, their group 
ratings of trust were significantly lower than those of the low acquisition group, but statistically 
equal to those of the high acquisition group. 
 Why were the low acquisition group’s ratings of trust so high?  Measured strictly on 
performance (optimal routes selected), the no and low acquisition groups were equal.  The 
difference was in the type of errors committed.  As previously stated, the no acquisition group 
generally complied with the recommendation of the automation and predominately committed 
misuse errors.  The low acquisition group committed the same total number of  errors, but 
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committed significantly fewer misuse errors and significantly more disuse errors.  Due to the 
nature of the task, a misuse error always resulted in the participant knowing that the automation 
was responsible for the error.  However, a disuse error potentially created some doubt as to 
which team member was responsible for the error in navigation.  In the process of making a 
disuse error, the participant viewed the recommendation of the automation (route depicted by the 
green line), decided it was inaccurate, and then selected a different route.  Upon receiving the 
feedback “Sorry, you ended up in the wrong place.” the participant knew their route was 
incorrect, but they potentially could not know if the automation’s route was incorrect.  Thus, 
disuse errors probably resulted in lowering the self-confidence of the participant while increasing 
the user’s trust in the automation.  Under the perfect automation schema, hard to identify errors 
result in higher levels of trust, and not surprisingly, the low acquisition group had the highest 
level of trust in the automation. 
 Self-confidence has been identified as an important factor in automation compliance 
behavior.  Lee and Moray (1992, 1994) found that when user self-confidence exceeded the 
perceived reliability of the automation, then the user would select manual operation.  Conversely, 
if the self-confidence of the user fell short of the perceived reliability of the automation, then the 
user would comply with the recommendation of the automation.  Other studies, focusing on 
navigation systems and driver acceptance behavior found similar trends (Bonsall, 1992; Bonsall 
& Joint, 1991; Bonsall & Parry, 1990).  Bonsall and colleagues found that drivers would ignore 
navigation systems once they entered into a familiar part of town, but consulted the aid when 
they entered unfamiliar sections of a city.  Correspondingly, participants in the high acquisition 
group possessed high levels of self confidence and their performance on the test of learning 
shows they were familiar with the entire city.  Thus, they most likely relied on their own abilities 
to navigate the city and discarded the recommendation of the automation.  Additionally, because 
they knew the city well, automation errors would be classified as easy errors and their trust in the 
automation would be degraded.  The low acquisition group possessed lower levels of self 
confidence and judging from their performance on the test of learning were unfamiliar with 
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certain areas of the map.  They possessed higher levels of trust and committed both misuse and 
disuse errors.  Their misuse errors could be labeled as automation errors, but the disuse errors 
would create some ambiguity as to the true reliability of the aid.  Thus the low acquisition 
group’s level of trust was higher than that of the high acquisition group while the level of self 
confidence was lower.           
Implications 
 The results of this study obviously imply that a collaborative system (team of human and 
automated system) will perform at a much higher level if the user’s mental model is accurate or 
more complete.  Getting users to a level where they feel confident in their own abilities, yet 
understand the abilities and limitations of the automation will take time and resources.  This 
extra cost may make the added training prohibitive to some organizations, but the alternative is 
even less desirable.  Putting users through crash course training sessions and hoping their mental 
models develop during on the job training could result in unpredictable performance by the 
collaborative system; a performance that includes errors by the automation (misuse) and errors 
by the user (disuse).   Although organizations and businesses might not think of putting a user in 
a collaborative system without training, the results of this system in terms of pure performance 
would be comparable to that of a collaborative system containing a user with a weak mental 
model produced by substandard training.   
    
Caveats 
 One limitation of this study is the limited scope of the team mental model studied.  
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse (1993) identified four types of team mental models and 
placed the environment (simulated city map in this study) as one of the aspects of the job/task 
mental model.  To understand fully how the collaborative system team is affected by changes in 
mental model, other types and aspects of mental models need researching.  For instance, another 
type of team mental model deals with the technology equipment.  In a collaborative system, 
where one of the team members is the technology equipment, this type of mental model is 
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crucial.  The likely failures of the automation, the programming behind it, and sources of 
information used by the aid all combine to form this type of mental model.    
 Another limitation of the study was the fidelity of the task environment.  While it was 
important to control the task environment for this study, the generalizability of the results to 
actual navigation with an in-car system might suffer from lack of fidelity.  There are possibly 
immeasurable variables affecting the performance of a collaborative system made up of a driver 
and an in-car navigation system attempting to navigate the confines of a city.  A logical follow 
on study would attempt to replicate these results in a higher fidelity environment (driving 
simulator) or actual driving environment to identify some of these other variables and their 
effects on performance. 
 The measurement of mental models is also critical for extending this research.  The 
acquisition tasks and test of learning, similar to those used by Gilbert and Rogers (1999), provide 
an approximation of the knowledge possessed by the participants about the map.  Whether 
participants used that knowledge as a mental simulation to describe, predict and explain the task 
environment as they navigated through it was not directly assessed.  Yet, given only the blank 
city map, an origin, and a destination, the participants were forced to determine an optimal route 
using some knowledge structure and the mental model construct most likely approximates that 
structure.   
 A follow on study could incorporate a minor change to determine the extent of participant 
usage of the automation.  In its current form, the navigation trial displays the recommendation of 
the automation for the duration of the trial.  The green line is displayed and available for the 
participant to reference as desired.  The ambiquity comes from not knowing if this information is 
used and to what extent it’s being used by the participants from each acquisition group.  A 
simple change hiding the green line then displaying the route when the participant demands it 
(i.e., presses the space bar) would indicate the actual reliance behavior of the participant.  The 
work of Bonsall (1990, 1991, &1992) and Lee and Moray (1992 & 1994), suggests that 
participants will reference the automation as a function of their self-confidence.  For instance, 
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members of a high acquisition group would likely reference the automation occasionally, but 
members of the low acquisition group would have higher levels of reliance and the members of 
the no acquisition group would likely reference the aid on every trial.  This relativley simple 
change could potentially reveal more about the relationship between mental models and trends 
for automation usage.  Figure 18 depicts a qualitative model that may describe the variables 
affecting automation usage.  The model shows that mental model quality directly affects self 
confidence and the ability to classify and identify automation errors.  As previously noted, when 
self confidence exceeds perceived reliability or trust users will most likely rely on their own 
abilities to complete a task.  Under the perfect automation schema errors classified as easy tend 
to degrade trust rapidly.  By incorporating the simple change described (automation 
recommendation on demand), a follow-on study should be able to test the accuracy of this 
qualitative model.   
      
Figure 18. Qualitative model of mental model effects on automation usage.  Note. * refers to 
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  As Wilson and Rutherford (1989) put it, “There is, perhaps, a desire to apply it (mental 
models) to a whole range of issues even before we know if it has utility as an explanation of 
mind and behavior” (p. 618). While Wilson and Rutherford warned against the abuse of the 
mental model construct to explain a whole host of phenomena they admitted, “there is still much 
for the human factors profession to explore and utilize in the mental models concept” (p. 630).  
They go on to mention the need for the field to explore various tasks in a variety of systems and 
how mental models explain performance within this problem space.  The current study explored 
a collaborative system in a navigation task and while the problem of accurately measuring and 
explaining the mental model construct may need further refinement, the study shows that mental 
models are an important part of automation research and deserve future investigation.            
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APPENDIX A 
Checklist for Trust between People and Automation 
 
Below is a list of statements for evaluating trust between people and automation.  There are 
several scales for you to rate intensity of your feeling of trust, or your impression of the system 
while operating a machine.  Please circle the number that best describes your feeling or your 
impression. 
 
(Note: 1 = not at all; 7 = extremely) 
 
1) Automated systems are deceptive 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
2) Automated systems behave in an underhanded manner 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
3) I am suspicious of automated system’s intent, action, or outputs 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
4) I am wary of automated system 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
5) An automated system’s actions will have a harmful or injurious outcome 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
6) I am confident in automated systems 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
7) Automated systems provide security 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
8) Automated systems have integrity 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
9) Automated systems are dependable 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
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10) Automated systems are reliable 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
11) I can trust automated systems 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
12) I am familiar with automated system 
1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 
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APPENDIX B 
LIKERT SCALE SURVEY 
Please consider all of the navigation trials you completed while answering these questions. 
 
1.  I was confident in my ability to navigate through the city. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. The automated aid was correct most of the time. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  I felt unprepared and unqualified to conduct the navigational task.  
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.  The automated aid hurt my performance more than it helped. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.  I felt that my teammate and I worked well together. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The automated aid was not my teammate. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  The navigational task was very difficult.  
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  I’m glad I had a teammate to help me when I wasn’t sure about directions. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The automated aid was wrong more that I thought it would be. 
Strongly Disagree  Neither agree nor disagree  Strongly Agree 




        50  
APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLES OF TRIALS 
 













• Using the mouse, grab and drop the numbered squares 
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Figure 21. Example of relational question. 
 
 
Figure 22. Example of directional question. 
is north of 
True Falseor 














Figure 23. Example of map reconstruction task. 
N 
• Construct the map you studied by 
dragging and dropping the city blocks onto 
the empty grid system.   








Figure 24. Example of navigation task. 
SUBMIT RESET 
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APPENDIX D 
DIRECTIONS FOR TASKS 
Directions for Drag and Drop Practice (Mouse Practice) 
● In each trial you will be required to move numbered boxes from the edges of the screen to their 
numbered locations on the grid system. 
● To grab a box, move the cursor over it with the mouse and hold the left mouse button down. 
● To drop a box, move the “grabbed” box over the desired square on the grid system and release 
the left mouse button. 
● Once you have dragged and dropped all the numbered boxes onto the grid, select SUBMIT and 
continue onto the next trial.   
Directions for Studying Map 
● In the next trail you will be shown a 4 block X 4 block replication of a city.  
● You will have one minute to study the city.  Pretend you are looking at the city from above, 
with the top of the screen being north and the right side of the screen being east.   
● Concentrate on the city blocks as you will be tested on your ability to remember the city by its 
blocks.   
● When you are ready to continue select the CONTINUE button with the mouse and your one 
minute will begin. 
Directions for Map Reconstruction 
● In the following trial you will be required to reconstruct the city you just studied.  
● The blocks of the city will be randomly arranged on the edges of the screen. 
● Drag and Drop the city blocks onto the grid system in the same way that you practiced earlier. 
● It is important to be as accurate as possible, but work quickly.  
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 ● When you are ready to proceed select the CONTINUE button. 
Directions for Relational Questions 
● In the following trials you will be required to answer a series of relational questions about the 
city you studied. 
● You will see two city blocks with a relational statement. 
● You must decide if the statement is true or false by selecting the appropriate button on the 
screen with your mouse.  You will complete two practice trials followed by 16 test trials.  Be as 
accurate as possible, but work quickly. 
● When you are ready to proceed select the CONTINUE button. 
Directions for Directional Questions 
● In the following trials you will be required to answer a series of directional questions about the 
city you studied. 
● You will see two city blocks and determine which cardinal direction you must travel for how 
many of blocks to get from one city block to the other.  You will complete two practice triasl 
followed by 16 test trials.  Be as accurate as possible, but work quickly. 
● When you are ready to proceed select the CONTINUE button. 
Directions for Navigation Task 
● In the following trials you will navigate the city you have studied. 
● You will see a blank city grid with labeled streets and avenues. 
● You will be shown pictures of two blocks you studied.  One will be your current location and 
one will be your desired destination.  Using the mouse, you must draw the optimal route from 
origin to destination.   
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● To assist you in your journey is an automated navigational teammate.  Your teammate will 
provide you with its best estimate of how to travel from one location to the other and is highly 
accurate, but not perfect. 
● Here are some rules to follow during your journey: you can travel only one block on a 
particular street before you must turn to another street.  Put another way, you must make a turn at 
every intersection.   
● You and your teammate will conduct 2 practice trials with feedback and 20 test trials, all with 
feedback. 
Things to remember 
● There is only one optimal route per trial. 
● You and your teammate will be evaluated collectively on your ability to navigate correctly and 
efficiently through the city.   
● When you are ready to proceed select the CONTINUE button. 
Directions for Automation Reliability Assessment 
Please indicate, using a number, the reliability of the Automated Navigation System over the last 
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